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Who Vibrates?
C h r i s t o p h e r S w i t h i n b a n k
Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
There are things you shake. You shake apple trees to ask for fruit. Climbing
trees, to see how much they can hold. Presents, bags of treasure, boxes of
cereal, jars of coins—you shake to know what is inside, howmuch is left, how
much is there to go still.
You shake the hands of people you don’t know, the shoulders of people you
thought you knew, maybe also to find out what is inside them. You listen,
carefully, to the sound of the person being shaken, try to hear—what is in-
side—howmuch is left—howmuch can they hold?
—Carolyn Chen, Threads
CAROLYN CHEN ’S THREADS, “FOR AMERICAN S IGN LANGUAGE INTERPRETER
strung to wind chimes at a distance and a story on tape,” is a performance
piece lasting around a quarter of an hour in which we hear the composer
speaking to us on a recorded track, while the performer on stage is instructed
to interpret Chen’s words for us in American Sign Language (ASL) (2014a;
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2014b). Chimes made from paper, leaves, wood, and glass tremble over the
audience in response to the movements of the ASL interpreter on stage. At
times, the narrator’s voice trembles as it spins strands of folkloric simplicity
and pop-cultural fantasy into a dream haze of tip-of-the-tongue allegory.
Chen’s recorded voice evokes the telling of folktales or stories for children
in its bold but simple language. Indeed, its opening address—“You told me a
story once . . . ”—evokes the archetypal “Once upon a time . . . ,” situating us in
the past tense of the fairytale (2014a, 4). The naturalistic setting of fairytale or
myth resonates in the text’s sea, fish, birds, or “my body . . . pulled, into the
body, of a tree” but is expanded upon by contemporary comic-book counter-
parts with “superpowers,” legs that can stretch “like chewing gum,” and the
ability to “travel at super speed” (2014a, 4–7). To a certain extent, Chen’s
choice of language provides readymade syntax and pathos, which support
cohesion evenas the story itself swerves, fractures, andultimately escapes any
unified teleological reading. The bubble of safety provided by the fantastical,
which expands physics and circumscribes the impact of even extreme vio-
lence, provides a space for images whose cumulative effect is ameditation on
communication and the corporeality of language.
In a preface to the performance score, Chen notes:
Living abroad at the time of writing, issues around communication—who you
are able to communicate with, what you have the ability to express, what is
able to be heard or understood—were particularly foregrounded. The writing
moves between different voices, sometimes matter-of-fact, sometimes
wrapped-in-a-dream. The feeling is of coming at English from Chinese, or
writing sentences as music. (2014a, 2)
Threads layersmomentsof communicativepassageacross a surprisinglywide
range of linguistic, narrative, and material junctions. As Chen notes, the
question of linguistic expression and comprehension was at the forefront of
her mind during the work’s conception. On the recorded track, the narrator
describes how “voices became water, dissolved into points, and floated, flew
out, and away.” The stories the narrator tells and those the narrator tells us
she is told continually return to “issues around communication,” but the way
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they do so suggests that the problem is not necessarily one of linguistics or
semantics. Rather, in the universe Chen brings to life, these issues become
fleshy: the narrator’s “tongue was a fish, it swam away,” while she addresses
another storyteller whose “mouth was full of water, water you couldn’t hold.”
It seems tongues themselves take on a life of their own, while voices are
physically prevented from leaving their bodies. Joseph Jonghyun Jeon finds
similar mouths—which are either recalcitrant or hyperactive depending
on your perspective—in the poetry of Myung Mi Kim, some of whose
attempts to find poetic expression for the experience of learning English
he describes as requiring “an exercise of the mouth, a veritable workout of
the tongue.” For Jeon, Kim’s poetry captures the physicality of a foreign
language as it dissolves semantics and revolves around repeating sonic
fragments, linking words by shared sounds and mouth shapes (2004, 137).
To paraphrase Chen, this “coming at English from Korean” reveals that com-
municative passage is not a questionof translationbetween equivalencies but
rather of a productive act across multiple orders. The loss usually posited as
inherent to translation and representation is shown instead to be an excess of
new meaning. When we “can no longer see . . . the language for the mouths,”
we are discovering something new about both language and mouths (Jeon
2004, 147).
Chen’s Threads orchestrates a similar excess of new meaning not just in
addressing communicative difficulties in its text but also in its premise of
having its performer interpret the spoken text as their primary task.While the
protagonists in Chen’s story find their attempts to communicate challenged
by their own mouths, and these difficulties give rise to fantastical situations
and solutions, the interpreter engages in a live translation of the text intoASL,
in the process producing a new version of the protagonists’ struggles. Just as
Myung Mi Kim’s approach to English casts new light on its sounds and
physical demands from a culturally specific experience, this act of translation
is not a question of one-to-one—or even lossy—transmission but instead a
productive passage marked by cultural difference and relation. As Jessica
Berson writes, the culture of “DEAF-WORLD”—an attempted translation of
theASL term for thedeaf community—mightbest beunderstoodas “a linguis-
tic minority group more in line with groups defined by ethnicity, religion, or
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sexual orientation,” and as such it brings with it its own cultural forms and
expressive possibilities (2005, 44). The artist Christine Sun Kim describes
being told by her cousin that she “behaved as if I had lived my whole life in
another countrywith their customs and rules” but goes on to imagine a future
inwhichher own relationship to sound is as valid as that of normative hearing
culture, and where her “own language [ASL] would be good enough” (2015,
34–35).
Sun Kim’s work seeks to capture her personal relationship to sound both
as physical phenomenon—movement, vibration—and cultural form—the re-
actions, responses, and expectations she observes in the behavior of hearing
individuals. She characterizes part of this practice as “a loose translation of
sound to another form” (Selby 2011), and this translation between sensory
forms is found echoed in Chen’s protagonists, who constantly find hearing
and sight mismatched: “You signaled, but I didn’t hear,” “I couldn’t see, what
they were saying,” “I wanted to tell you, but you couldn’t hear” (Chen 2014a,
4–5, 7). While these intersensory junctures might at first seem like points of
communicative failure, Chen hints at the productive quality of these sites of
sensory translationwhen she describes the feeling of struggling to communicate
across language barriers as akin to “writing sentences as music” (2014a, 2). Her
interest in intermedia work provides a rich terrain for hybrid expression of
this kind, a formof expression already present in her childhood piano studies,
which she has described as “a kind of willed sensory hallucination, trying to
inhabit the bodies of people and things I was not—channeling the energies of
teachers, sumo wrestlers, bears—and projecting this onto the instrument”
(2016).1 Indeed, Threads stages just such a projection of feeling across partic-
ipants and begins to reveal the materiality of these connections. While the
bond between recorded voice and ASL interpreter is implicit—its physicality
is oneof soundwaves andphotons—the threadsbinding the interpreter to the
chimes are far more obviously material and begin to raise questions of who is
translating whom and where the origin of the agency in Threads lies. For a
hearing audience, we might speculate that the obvious flow is from Chen’s
digitized voice, to the signing interpreter’s body, along the threads, and
into the chimes above the audience. At each step in this causal chain, we
encounter something or someone whose agency is increasingly delegated
1 4 4  Wh o V i b r a t e s ?
This work originally appeared in CR: The New Centennial Review 18.2, fall 2018, published by Michigan State University Press. 
to the previous actor, until we arrive at quivering leaves, pulled around on
the end of a string.
In a sound-normative society, the expectation is that the sounding voice
precedes and dictates the possibilities of the signing body. However, Chen’s
compositional decisions shape the performance to trouble that hierarchy. In
deciding to place her narrative voice on tape, she denies it the opportunities
for bodily expression that the signing interpreter on stage has. One is never
presented as the low-fidelity reproduction of the other, nor do they compete
for superiority in a given register. Each is allowed to contribute its unique
qualities, which form a hybrid multisensory register.
V I B R A T I N G M A T T E R
If Chen’s Threads stages a network of sensory translation and transmission of
expressive vibration—if, perhaps, the transmission of expressive vibration
might stand in as an abstracted description of music itself—the questions
arise: who or what is vibrating and what is necessary for a translation to take
place? If we take vibration as the starting point for an analysis, implying that
in doing so we are able to bridge sensory registers and modes of being, what
further implications are there?
In recent “New Materialist” thought, vibration seems to lurk not that far
below the surfaceas a force animating thematerialworld. InElizabethGrosz’s
understanding, “art unleashes and intensifies . . . the creative and destructive
impact of vibratory force on bodies, on collectives, on the earth itself” (2008,
62). Her description of art as a question of force and energy, drawn from a
Deleuzian chaos, captures succinctly the primordial qualities attributed to
vibration, with music granted the power to render sonorous “forces . . . that
are themselves nonsonorous” (57). Christoph Cox’s call for a “sonic material-
ism” also takes up this language in proposing an analysis of the “complexes of
forcesmaterially inflected by other forces and force-complexes” he argues are
present in sound art, also tracing this form of analysis back to Deleuze (2011,
157).
In the vital materialism Jane Bennett lays out in Vibrant Matter, vibration
is an implicit presence throughout. Bennett chooses “vibrancy” as theprimary
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quality of matter “to induce in human bodies an aesthetic-affective openness
tomaterial vitality” with the politico-philosophical aim of rescuing themate-
rial world from being perceived as so many inert, powerless objects (2010, x).
Through both theory and examples, Bennett urges us to see matter as lively
and capable of action, revisiting Spinozan conatus as the power invested in
every “body,” humanornot (2010, 2). In this context, vibrancy seemsvery close
to its etymological roots, with vibrant matter not simply being full of life but
matière vibrante, agitated and quivering to demonstrate its agentive capaci-
ties. As Bennett makes clear, her project is to work on “onto-theological
binaries” but at the same time has an “aesthetic-affective” component that is
of equal importance due to its potential for reshaping the political sphere
(2010, 104–8). Similar to these ostensibly egalitarian goals, Cox believes that
conceiving of sound as “anonymous flux” will help us escape a number of
familiar binaries: “culture and nature, human and nonhuman, mind and
matter, the symbolic and the real, the textual and the physical, themeaningful
and the meaningless” (2011, 157). In other words, turning to sound’s material-
ity and force will allow us to access a broader, less anthropocentric perspec-
tive onartistic phenomena, just asBennett’s attending to the vibratoryquality
of matter will bring the nonanthropic back into the political fold.
In all of these projects, there seems to be an appeal to vibration as natural
or fundamental. Vibration is drawn from an elementary chaos for Grosz, is an
animating property for all matter for Bennett, and precedes “cultural history”
for Cox (Cox 2018, 234). Although ultimately all three theorists are interested
in vibration’s impact on social questions, all three also locate the sourceof this
vibration as preceding human perception, something Marie Thompson has
termed an “origin myth” (Thompson 2017, 266; James 2018). To begin to
trouble the question of vibration’s naturalness, we might take mrudangam
artist and composer Rajna Swaminathan’s definition of sound art as “an
offering of resonance or vibration, in the context of a community that might
find something familiar, of aesthetic value, or socially cohesive, in the gestures
and sonorities presented.” Swaminathan describes how it has been hard for
her to think in terms of “sound” with its implications of presocial vibration,
recognizing instead through practices of intercultural performance and im-
provisation that these vibrations are always already “in the context of a
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community” (Swaminathan2018). Ifwe return to thepremiseof our readingof
Threads, namely, that ASL interpreter, recorded voice, and chimes interact
across sensory registers, constituting a work particularly open to diverse
forms of apprehension, we might also begin to suspect that the vibration
operating through the eponymous threads is not a “pure intensity,” as Grosz
might have it, but a social phenomenon as much as a material one (Grosz
2008, 31).
Alongside a conception of vibration as a natural phenomenon, vibration
also receives an endorsement as the aesthetic-affective force of choice due its
perceived friendliness. Key to Bennett’s work is her insistence on matter’s
cooperative nature. Her depiction is of vibrantmatter as an open and produc-
tive partner, filled with “creative activity,” which specifically resists compre-
hension “in terms of social structures” because its powers exceed a “condi-
tioning recalcitrance or capacity to obstruct.” While framed in terms of an
extension of a fuller agency to the nonhuman material world, it is also clear
that the socialmodalities of resistance, recalcitrance, or obstructionbelong to
“stolidwholes,” not the vibrating actants of ahappierworld (Bennett 2010, 35).
Robin James has observed similarly rose-tinted conceptions of vibration in its
application in “social physics” and the theories of Hartmut Rosa. She de-
scribes Rosa as interested in vibration in that he “imagines resonance as
connectedness, the capacity to affect and be affected by people and things
that are different from you.”2 As James points out, this vaguely resembles
sympathetic resonance and posits a kind of universal acoustic sociality in
which vibration passed between individuals is capable of resolving and har-
monizing difference (James 2017b). James’s analysis of social physics re-
veals a similar conception of vibration as sympathetic and cooperative via
resonance and ultimately harmony: “a harmonious society is one whose
parts are arranged in accordance with the principles of social physics,
namely, the ratios and probabilities that result from ‘having a mathemat-
ical, predictive science of society,’” and this science relies on a vibratory
description of the force by which social interactions move through large
groups of individuals. In both cases, vibration and the potential for har-
mony are abstracted to an apparently natural plane such that they appear
“seemingly objective” (James 2017a).3
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That vibration is portrayed as pliant and cooperative—a normalizing
force that smooths over difference—raises the question of what being ac-
corded vibration means for the vibrating thing. Bennett directly opposes her
“creative” actants with those who only have the “capacity to obstruct” (2010,
35), and in this context, vibration’s invocation for its perceived affective po-
liteness suggests the agency granted vibrant matter is tied to its perceived
capacity to con-struct. This cooperative urge is ultimatelywhat allows vibrant
matter to act most powerfully “in or as a heterogeneous assemblage” (2010,
23), but onewonders what happens to these vibrations if they encounter such
an arm as that found in Sara Ahmed’s account of willfulness. Ahmed takes up
a horrifying story from the Brothers Grimm of a “willful” girl whose perceived
disobedience is punishedwithdeathandwhosearmcontinues to comeupout
of her grave until it is beaten down by the girl’s mother with a rod. As Ahmed
notes, “willfulness is used as an explanation of disobedience,” willfulness is an
excess of will, while the disciplining rod “is not deemed willful.” What is
interesting about the story is how the arm posthumously receives the girl’s
willfulness, which is “displaced . . . from a body to a body part” (2017, 67). Like
vibrant matter, the arm is animated by an agentive force, operating indepen-
dently of the rest of its body, driven by a will of its own. Unlike vibrantmatter,
however, the arm is seen as obstinate and recalcitrant. It will not cooperate,
and because it is expected to be obedient, it is judged to be willful. Ahmed’s
accountprovides a correctional toBennett’s vibration in that itmakes explicit
that willfulness—or cooperativeness—is not an objective attribute of certain
people or things. Rather, the girl’s willfulness is predicated on gendered ideas
about her behavior, on what those adjudging her willful expect her to be:
“willfulness is assigned to girls because girls are not supposed to have awill of
their own” (2017, 68).
While warning against the risks of an anthropomorphic gaze, Bennett
does not provide an equivalent account of how her aesthetic-affective project
is impacted by what precedes a human encounter with vibrant matter (Ben-
nett 2010, 99). Indeed, vibrancy can be read alongside willfulness in the sense
that, despite its presentationasapositive andempoweringattribute, vibrancy
is granted specifically tomatter that is not expected to have agency. Vibrancy,
it would seem then, is not an affect of agency but of an agency’s being judged
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to be excessive. Here we might return to Swaminathan’s “vibration in the
context of a community,” a formulation that invokes “community” as that
which precedes, as that which determines vibration’s affect. This definition
generalizes, for sound art, what Ahmed’s analysis of willfulness shows: that
properties attributed to a subject’s object are in fact properties of the object-
for-the-subject. In reading vibration alongside willfulness, the political impli-
cations of these NewMaterialist approaches begin to come into focus.
V I B R A T I O N A N D R A C E
In unraveling liberal subjecthood’s development hand-in-hand with Euro-
pean colonialism, Lisa Lowe cites British ordinances in occupied Hong Kong
that grant police broad powers when dealing with “persons . . . who cannot
give a satisfactory account of themselves.” Lowe writes that:
The subject “who cannot give a satisfactory account” cannot be ethical be-
cause he cannot place himself in relation to a community from whose norms
he is constitutively excluded, and inwhose norms hewould need to grammat-
ically constitute himself. (Lowe 2015, 245)
Lowe presents in great detail the ways in which European liberalism takes
care to place certain people outside of its definitions of subjecthood, mak-
ing—among other things—their disenfranchisement, dehumanization, and
enslavement possible, with race as the critical vector for the enactment of this
exclusion. In this example, we encounter quite concretely what is at stake in
the attribution of agency orwillfulness. Those “who cannot give a satisfactory
account of themselves” are deemed willful and, as a consequence, can be
detained by police at will. As with Ahmed’s example of the willful girl, it is not
that the colonial subject does not have agency or that an account of him- or
herself is not possible, but that these are foreclosed by a legislating community
that renders the account illegible-for-the-community (Lowe 2015, 124).
While willfulness and unaccountability are figured as negative by their
judges and vibrancy is presented as a positive attribute (with its judges
elided), Lowe provides a telling example for understanding what is at stake in a
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relationtovibrantmatter,orinthejudgmentofathingasvibrating.Inherexploration
ofcuteness,SianneNgaicatalogsways inwhichaWesternsubject—thatof theEuro-
pean avant-garde—adopts “cute” things as handy helpers in philosophy and poetry,
citing“Stein’scupandcheese,Williams’splums,andAshbery’scocoatins . . .Wittgen-
stein’scookingpot,Heidegger’sjugandshoes”(Ngai2005, 841). Inheranalysis,Ngai
suggests that although the affect of cuteness is generally positively conno-
tated, there is in fact a violence in the attribution of cuteness, because it
“names an aesthetic encounter with an exaggerated difference in power”
(2005, 828). If this is the case, then we might argue that the attribution of
vibrancy may also arise not from an equalizing gesture but from a preceding
inequality. Indeed, preempting Bennett, Ngai writes of “how easily the act of
endowing a dumb object with expressive capabilities can become a dominat-
ing rather thanbenevolent gesture” (2005, 832).4 In otherwords, by electing to
deploy the affective shimmer of vibrancy as matter’s route to expression and
agency, we may in fact be more interested in drawing matter into our own
existing systems of knowledge, affect, and communication.
There is of course a significant difference between Lowe andNgai’s exam-
ples: while Ngai presents a power difference between an object nominated as
cute and its subject, Lowe addresses the power difference between a human
excluded from sociality by the legislative impacts of a European liberal sub-
ject. Thematerial circumstances and repercussions of these twodominations
are not equivalent even if they bear a formal resemblance. Nevertheless, these
formal resemblances come into sharper focus when one considers Ngai’s
further work on affect and race. Similarly to how she understands cuteness as
a product of a power imbalance between the apprehended and the appre-
hender, Ngai elaborates a concept of “animatedness” that
foregrounds the degree to which emotional qualities seem especially prone to
sliding into corporeal qualities where the African American subject is con-
cerned, reinforcing the notion of race as a truth located, quite naturally, in the
always obvious, highly visible body. (Ngai 2007, 95)
Ngai’s animatedness can be juxtaposed with Ahmed’s willfulness in the sense
thatwhilewillfulness names the subjectwhohas toomuchwill, animatedness
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is attributed to those for whomwill is foreclosed. Unlike the sovereign subject
whose body is seen as acting under the subject’s control, the animated body is
seenasbeingunwilledanduncontrolled.Theanimated subject cannot give an
account of itself because, like the colonized Chinese “vagrant” in Lowe’s
example, it is “constitutively excluded” from the community that constitutes
it as animated. Because it is assumed to be incapable of will, its actions are
attributed to animation. Ngai reads a scene from Harriet Beecher Stowe’s
Uncle Tom’s Cabin in which Tom’s preaching is rendered not as his speech or
self-expression but rather as “a kind of ventriloquism: language from an
outside source that ‘drop[s] from his lips’ without conscious volition” (Ngai
2007, 97). The affective force behind animation is so strong that even speech
can be perceived as driven by automatism or puppetry, transforming from a
sign of communication, rationality, and agency, to a sign of a body out of
control, a body only capable of speech through an act of ventriloquism. In this
there is a strong resonance between Stowe’s Tom and the reception of perfor-
mances by the enslaved musician Thomas “Blind Tom” Wiggins, who Willa
Cather described as “a human phonograph, a sort of animated memory, with
soundproducingpowers” (Brooks 2014, 398). Cather’s description rests on the
same assumption as Stowe’s, that the expression of these enslavedmen—one
historical, one fictional—could only be explained by mechanical replication:
Blind Tom is a machine for the passive reproduction of music but is not
granted any creative capacity; Uncle Tom has absorbed scripture to such an
extent that it can animate himwithout his intervention.5 In both cases, vibra-
tion is granted the power to take ahold of thesemen such that theirmusic and
speech shake them like rag dolls.
For amore recent example of how animatedness denies a subject’s capac-
ity for agency, we might turn to a 1999 Kentucky Supreme Court ruling, in
which it was decided that a witness could “identify a voice as being that of a
particular race or nationality” from its sound alone (Eidsheim 2015, 22). As
Nina Sun Eidsheim notes, this judgment rests on “an assumption that the
speaker in question did not completely control his body, and therefore could
not help but sound in a way that identified him” (2015, 23). In this case, the
possibilities for vibration in the vocal cords of the speaker are believed to be
constrained by a preceding racial imaginary. His voice must necessarily be-
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tray his racialized body, because his race is believed to be an objective and
natural part of his corporeal being and therefore a defining constraint on his
voice. In effect, vibration is attributednot to the subject’swill but to a separate
animating force, in this case some kind of force unavoidably present in the
racialized body. In rendering voices as will-less, race is naturalized via vibra-
tion, and the subject falls prey to animatedness.
Eidsheim finds the same assumptions at play in approaches to classical
vocal pedagogy during her own studies as a singer, writing that “all but two
teachers told me that they can always tell the ethnicity of the singer by his or
her vocal timbre” (Eidsheim2015, 4). This racial logic is extended toavarietyof
bodies but significantly is withheld from “singers who appear to be European
American,” which is to say that in establishing this logic, the operative force is
awhiteness that grants full subjecthood and thus protects the individual from
being judged to have a recalcitrant, uncontrollable body (2015, 25). Following
Eidsheim’s analysis of the Kentucky Supreme Court ruling, it is clear that
these teachers hold the belief that there are irreducible, racially determined
characteristics in the voices of students who appear Asian American or Afri-
can American, for example, that are not present in the voices of European
American students, whose “inner essence” does not pose such corporeal
resistance (Eidsheim 2015, 6). When Ngai describes Stowe’s depiction of Tom
as likening him “to an instrument, porous and pliable, for the vocalization of
others,” she also describes the circular logic that generates animatedness: a
white gaze vocalizes itself throughTom’s bodyby seeing it as animated, and in
the process claims his body to be an instrument animated by others (Ngai
2007, 97). Eidsheim describes the same circular process, writing that “what-
everwebelieve is projectedonto the sound” (2015, 11). Through this projection,
what we believe becomes considered a natural attribute of the sound, and the
white gaze turns transparent, an objective lens or perfect resonant system
through which the world is faithfully and truthfully transmitted.
Such a generative but unacknowledged whiteness as that observed by
both Ngai and Eidsheim is what John Gillespie has critiqued as “a resurfacing
of epistemic violence” through a denial of “the epistemic agency of the thing”
with regard to the theoryof vibrantmatter.Heargues thatBennett’s approach
is ultimately scuppered by the elision of her white gaze, linking her approach
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to the “thing” with the white gaze’s forceful history in the legislation of black
bodies as objects or things. Specifically, drawing on Frantz Fanon and Fred
Moten, Gillespie suggests that a failure to engage with histories of racializa-
tion and radical black thought on objecthood dooms an analysis of the thing
to reproduce historical violence. Reversing Bennett’s call for “not Flower
Power, or Black Power, or Girl Power, but Thing-Power,” Gillespie counters
that “to see the fact of blackness is to see that Black Power, is always already
Thing Power” (Bennett 2010, 6; Gillespie 2017).6 In his own critique of New
Materialist thought, André Carrington also questions the reinscription of
Enlightenment humanism onto objects, characterizing this epistemic projec-
tion as relying “for its stability on nonhuman objects fashioned out of human
flesh.” Carrington describes his reluctance to engage with the fruits of post-
humanism by acknowledging—unlike the theorists he is pushing back
against—that he could only engage with such ideas as an object’s having
agency from an “explicitly Black and human” perspective. EchoingMoten like
Gillespie, Carrington knows “that objects can and do resist, but the reason I
know this—my epistemological ground—is that my ancestors were objects”
(2017, 281). These perspectives challenge New Materialist thinkers to tackle
the racial and historical lacunae in their theories, arguing that a failure to do
so risks reproducing many of the errors NewMaterialism claims to address.
For Lowe, Ngai, and Eidsheim, it is clear that historical and social sub-
jects—European liberal humanist, white, and male—produce affective rela-
tionships to individuals who are excluded or understood as different, which
naturalizes those differences, rendering them as objective givens. Ahmed’s
theorization demonstrates the affect of willfulness to be the product of a
similar generating subject: while the gender of the girl in Grimm’s story is
generative of a judgment of willfulness, Ahmedwrites that “the willful child is
also the story of the subaltern,” the willfulness of the colonized subject who
cannot speak to give an account of him- or herself (2017, 80). The implications
are broad and carry varyingweights, from furnishing “the economic, aswell as
political and humanitarian, rationales for British imperial governance in
Asia” (Lowe 2015, 104) to shaping current classical vocal practice. To be clear,
the ways in which things may be read as symptomatic of this line of thought
are many, and the impact is anything but singular or monolithic. These
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examples provide us with both a more generic understanding of the stake of
power for the relational subject as well as specifically situated analyses that
impact upon how we approach vibration and its affective relatives, including
resonance, vibrancy, and animation.
Theories that would take vibration as a universal, underlying force capa-
ble of resolving both political andontological questions need to dealwith how
they continue in the vein of unsituated, uncritically Eurocentric thought that
universalizes its subjects and fails to take account of its own productive gaze.
In response to Cox’s sonic materialism, Marie Thompson formulates a corol-
lary to thewhite gaze she dubs “white aurality,” which succinctly summarizes
the elision at the heart of Cox’s and others’ NewMaterialist thought. Thomp-
son describes how whiteness is able to perform its vanishing act through the
deployment of “a racialized perceptual schema that is at once situated and
‘modest’ insofar as its own, active presence is obscured” (2017, 278). The
“active presence” of whiteness—whiteness’s generative and productive im-
pact on perception—is “obscured” by assumingwhat it generates to be objec-
tively true. Cox’s contention “that cultural history supplements a natural
history that vastly preceded it” and therefore that a natural history—the
objective real of material vibration—is valid ground for his sonicmaterialism
to explore, repeats precisely the move that Thompson and others above have
identified (Cox 2018, 234). This is not to argue that vibration does not exist or
that all and any perception of the material world is only an illusory simula-
crum; rather, that any account of vibration must acknowledge the relations
that produce it. Cox dismisses Thompson’s critique as “classic relativist,” but
as Robin James responds, this supposes a plane of equivalencies, wherewhite-
ness is “one option among fungible, interchangeable options” rather than an
approach that acknowledges inequalities and imbalances in relations (Cox
2018, 238; James 2018).White aurality is not an equal but different counterpart
to other auralities, because it alone is granted the privilege of generating its
own invisibility to listen in to a vastly preceding natural history.
The problem with Cox’s sonic materialism, then, is not its engagement
with the material world per se but its inability to deal with race and power
imbalances by insisting on auniversalizing epistemological frame. If we are to
deploy theories of thematerial world, these need to account for the historical
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and situated epistemologies they relate to. As James writes, “it is entirely
possible to form abstractions that do not abstract those ongoing relations of
domination and subordination away” (James 2018). Similarly, while exploring
her concerns and suspicions of New Materialism, Kyla Wazana Tompkins
writes of how, even if lacking at this point, “New Materialist thinking must
necessarily engage radical interdisciplinarity,” which “in turn brings us back
to the provocations of left, feminist, queer, and critical race theory” (2016).
While Cox proposes a sonic ontology, Tompkins suggests that in fact materi-
alist approaches should take on a reinvigorated engagement with their pre-
ceding but unacknowledged kin, whose diverging epistemologies give the lie
to the scientistic tendencies of such New Materialist strands as object-
oriented ontology. For example, like Gillespie and Carrington, Tompkins
identifies cross-pollination with work “that seeks to reorient western episte-
mologies from the point of view of those who have never been human”—such
as that of Hortense Spillers, Sylvia Wynter, and Alexander Weheliye—as an
approach thatmay saveNewMaterialism from its tendency to claimanatural
neutrality. She also argues that the seeds for an antirepresentational analysis
“of the micro-workings of biopolitics in the contemporary mediatized politi-
cal era” can be found in materialist approaches—an approach arguably
represented by Eidsheim’s “micropolitics of timbre,” which identifies how
racialized perceptual regimes operate through constant judgments about the
materiality of the voice (Tompkins 2016; Eidsheim 2015, 14). In Tompkins’s
view, these interdisciplinary efforts can address such exclusions as those
identified by Thompson in “white aurality” by revivifyingmaterialist analyses
with approaches that explicitly tackle social differences rather than eliding
and naturalizing them.
“ A N A M B U L A N C E M A D E O F F I R E W O R K S ”
To return toCarolynChen’sThreads,wemight reevaluate itsnarratorasdescrib-
ing the vibration ascribed by a productive subject when she speaks of how “you
listen, carefully, to the sound of the person being shaken, try to hear—what is
inside—how much is left—how much can they hold?” In Threads, shaking is a
knowledge-producingpractice inwhichvibrationisthemediumforthetransmis-
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sion of information about an object—“bags of treasure, boxes of cereal, jars of
coins”—but this shaking makes explicit the intervention of the subject in the
generating of affective vibration (Chen2014a, 4). The “sound of the person” is as
much the person being shaken as “what is inside”—an “inner essence” or
natural vibration.Unlike the ventriloquizing vibratory affect of animatedness,
the shake clearly implicates the shaker. By amplifying the shake in the staging
of Threads through a series of suspended chimes, Chen renders material this
relational practice, treating the vibration that her music offers not as a pre-
ceding flux that she taps into but as a messy product of the social bodies
involved. For the onstage performer, ASL guides their movements as their
gestures “shake” the chimes as well as conveying linguistic meaning. Chen’s
stagingdrawsattention to themultiplemeanings andapprehensionsof vibra-
tion by different individuals, emphasizing in her text a constant crossing of
seeing andhearing, akin to the visual–social perception of sounddescribedby
Christine Sun Kim (Selby 2011). Instead of being presented as a singular
vibratory truth, Threads demonstrates the social complexity of vibration.
SpurredonbyTompkins’s critiqueofNewMaterialism,MichelleN.Huang
asks us to consider the potential of materialist approaches “to reconcile the
dividebetween the representational anddeconstructionistmodesof feminist,
critical race, queer, disability, and animal theory,” seeking to find ways in
whichmaterialist readingsmight in fact provide new inroads to talking about
race. For example, Huang suggests that materialist readings may counter the
assertion that a text is or isn’t “about” race by instead detecting race’s pres-
ence as it is folded into objects or aesthetic positions. In her view, such
adoptionsofNewMaterialistmethodologies “areproductivenot because they
move us ‘beyond’ race . . . but because they make visible how race is always
embedded within the production of the cultural forms used to fabricate the
human.” Huang reads poet John Yau’s “Confessions of a Recycled Shopping
Bag” for just this kind of presence, suggesting that the poem’s repetitive focus
on color in the bag’s “self”-description—“I used to be a purple polyethylene
pony,” for example—is reflective of a broader social obsession with skin col-
or—“I used to be a pleasant red colleague”—but that the multiple colors the
bag “used to be” indicate that “the banalmechanism of racial identification is
less an essential characteristic than one repeatedly transformed through
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various differentmeans of production.”Huang presents a convincing attempt
at readinganobject’s aesthetic presentation for situatedand socially vectored
qualities without the object itself having to represent or be “about” those
qualities. In doing so, she does not argue that there is “a master molecule for
race” inherent to the objects being read but that these objects’ qualities are
coproduced in the context of a community (Huang 2017).
Carolyn Chen’s performance essay, This Is a Scream, provides us with an
opportunity to try to takeupHuang’s challenge and readmateriality for traces
of racialized perception (Chen 2017). A 20-minute work written to be per-
formed by Chen herself, This Is a Scream has been compared by the composer
to a podcast or TED Talk in which she discusses how difficult it is for her to
scream while playing audio examples that blur the lines between scientific
specimen, reportage, and acousmatic composition (Daniel 2017). As she un-
ravels what a scream is, Chen tries to get closer and closer to its fleshy
vibration, saying that shewould like “to hold it inmyhand and turn it thisway
and that, to prod it and spread it apart to see what’s inside, because it sounds
tome like there are all these glistening little parts hiding in there” (Chen 2017).
Like a hybrid radio producer–scientist, Chen tries slowing down Justin Ver-
non and Nicki Minaj’s screams on “Monster,” from Kanye West’s 2010 album
MyBeautiful Dark Twisted Fantasy, to be able to probe deeper into the detail of
these guttural roars. The slowed-down screams descend lower and lower in
pitch, digital samples separating into a rumbling bass vibration, but Chen
expresses regret that she is “also losing the scream by slowing it down.”
Turning to language to try to capturewhat attracts her to Vernon andMinaj’s
screams, Chen draws on a kaleidoscopic range of highly tactile imagery:
If the sound of the scream were a picture, it might be an ambulance made of
fireworks. The colorwould be red and shiny and grainy and feathered because
there’s something a little fancy about it. If it were a fish, maybe it’d be a giant
shark, swarmed by all the little flashing fishes, the entourage, and the den-
tistry, swirling, sparkling around him like fairy godmother skirts. (Chen 2017)
Similarly to the language ofThreads, this fantastical description of the scream
attempts a kind of sensory translation, gathering a gallery of vivid objects to
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stand in for the scream’s affective power. Chen’s vision of the scream is
pervaded by danger via a giant shark with deadly teeth and an ambulance
made of explosives—the glissandos of sirens andwhistling rockets resonating
with one another—but the grain of Vernon’s and Minaj’s voices are heard as
also possessing a glittery and glamorous aspect, an “entourage” conjuring
celebrity, perhaps the sparking of camera flashes glinting off the shark’s teeth.
Later Chen compares the scream to a “molten chandelier.” This sensory
translation is an attempt to get closer to a thing—the scream—that Chen
can’t seem to embody herself. Chen turns to a literalist analysis of “blood
curdling”—an adjective often and almost exclusively used for screams—for a
further material sense of what the scream does. Curdling milk thickens and
clumps, so she asks, “what would be the sound of cottage cheese squishing its
way through arteries?” This continuous mapping of affective qualities from
the scream to other objects gradually accumulates to be a speculative mate-
rial thesaurus for people who can’t scream but might have visited a public
aquarium, eaten cottage cheese, or have arteries. Like the sensory translation
at work in Threads, this thesaurus attempts to render the affect of the scream
for a range of apprehending bodies, exposing thewealth of differentmeanings
within what at first appears to be a unitary vibration.
Key to Chen’s attraction to the scream is her own inability to scream.
There is a gently comic but also moving undertone to Chen’s efforts: she
enlists friends to scream for her, she asks for instructions, she rehearses
screaming as one might singing, searching for the break in her voice. Never-
theless, a friend hears her and laughs, “that’s not a scream” (Chen 2017). It
appears that—like the voices analyzed by Nina Sun Eidsheim—her body is
found to resist her efforts and her screams never fully scream (Eidsheim 2015,
23). Chenhasdescribed thepiece asbeing “about the limitationsofmybodyas
opposed to this universalized body,” and in this description we start to see
how she acknowledges race to be operating beneath the surface of the glitter-
ing scream (Daniel 2017). In attempting to understand why she cannot
scream, why she is coming up against this limit in her body, Chen recounts
howshe “grewup in suburbanNew Jersey,where Iwasoneof twoAsiankids in
class andneitherof usmademuchsound, talkingorotherwise. I thinkwe tried
as much as possible to disappear.” The scream, however, “lights up the world
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around it,” calling attention to itself and the screamer in a way that she feels
she has tried to avoid (Chen 2017). Chen identifies race as a factor in her own
physical difficulty to produce sound. The very real, material resistance
brought on by racialized expectations and socialization recalls Huang’s real-
ization that “despite knowing that race is amutable fiction that is socially and
materially distributed through networks of power, I could never say, even for
a moment, that I do not ‘believe in race’” (Huang 2017). Huang stresses that
this is not to say that race can be located as originating from and naturally
present inbodiesperceived tobe raced, rather that she is acutely awareof how
forceful race is regardless of its fictionality. Chen’s restricted voice also reso-
nates with Ngai’s reading of John Yau’s “Genghis Chan: Private Eye,” in which
the speaker announces, “A foul lump started making promises in my voice”
(Ngai 2007, 92). Ngai contends that the process through which this “lump”
asserts itself inGenghis Chan’s throat “might be read as an allegory of how the
AsianAmerican becomes forced into the position ofmodelminority,” that the
lump, whose sensory presence is physical or material, in fact is an embodied
experience of an enforced social role that suppresses the subject’s capacity for
expression (2007, 93). Chen describes a desire to experience the scream for its
power to release feelings caught in the body but finds herself denied this
release by her inability to scream. Trying “as much as possible to disappear”
leaves one holding feelings and unable to let them go by drawing attention to
them. Like the investigatory shaking described in Threads, vibration appears
to ask, “How much can they hold?” (Chen 2014a, 4). The scream is a mecha-
nism for allowing what is being held to escape, but this escape can be blocked
by a lump in the throat.
Ngai contrasts Chan’s animation by the lump, which generates a stereo-
typically “silent, inexpressive, . . . emotionally inscrutable” Asian subject, with
other forms of animatedness, which produce “exaggeratedly emotional, hy-
perexpressive, . . . ‘overscrutable’” subjects, such as that of Uncle Tom dis-
cussed previously (2007, 93). This exaggeratedly emotional figure surfaces in
This Is a Scream when we consider how Chen draws on Kanye West’s “Mon-
ster.” The track is a showcase for verses fromWest, Jay-Z, and Nicki Minaj, in
which each lays claim to being a monster “in ways that reinforce fantasies of
triumph and invincibility” (Winters 2017, 292). Of particular note is Minaj’s
C h r i s t o p h e r S w i t h i n b a n k  1 5 9
This work originally appeared in CR: The New Centennial Review 18.2, fall 2018, published by Michigan State University Press. 
contribution, in which she virtuosically veers between alter egos, tackling the
titularmonstrositywithwhat JosephWinters describes as “a split subjectwho
wears different masks and takes on different sexual and gender identities to
navigate and trouble a male-dominated space and visual terrain” (2017, 296).
The voice attributed to Minaj’s alter ego Roman Zalanski increasingly ends
lines with a snarling delivery as the verse progresses, culminating in the
closing scream—“I’m a motherfucking monster”—that Chen picks up for
further examination (West 2010). As Winters highlights, Minaj’s use of alter
egos allows her to trouble her gendered voice, contrasting the delivery style of
Zalanski with the higher-pitched and relatively softer vocal style of the alter
ego Barbie, while constantly asserting her artistic and financial worth. Chen
tries to zoom intoMinaj’s screamthroughdigital processingbut is confronted
with the fact that:
As she slows down, I start to lose her voice, her gender, her language. She
becomes indistinguishable from Bon Iver. By 85 percent [slower] she might
not even be a person anymore or even an animal. She could be a glacier. What
kind of feelings is that? (Chen 2017)
Chen is disappointed to find thatMinaj’s skillful deployment of sonicmasks is
lost to abstract vibration as the speed of the recording slows and her voice
becomes a low-frequency quaking. In this moment, we are shown that the
scream is not simply a glittering cascade of vibration to be picked apart, but
that this soundmost forcefully resonates in its expression of the personal, as a
release or sharing of pain or energy in the context of a community. The slow
screammay in some sense consist of the same material as the original, but it
dissolves the original’s affective force by loosening its contact with its social
signifiers—it generates an abstraction that “abstracts away from ongoing
relations of domination and subordination” (James 2018). As Minaj is slowed
down, she appears first as an animal and then a glacier. If the monstrousness
claimed by Minaj, Jay-Z, and West is presented as evidence of their excep-
tional skill and power, the technique of slowing completes the connection
between themonster and the “pernicious legacy of associatingBlacknesswith
the ‘not quite human,’ with that proverbial space between the human and the
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animal” (Winters 2017, 292). The slow scream is rendered animal or geologi-
cal, but in important ways it is simply no longer a scream, because a scream is
the vibration of someone screaming, because the vibrating subject is not a
neutral resonant body.
Answering the question of who vibrates requires us to take into account
such theories as those of white aurality or timbral micropolitics. These de-
scribe how vibration is not a natural or cosmic force detectable in the trem-
bling of objects but an affective category that rests on subjects’ power rela-
tions within sociocultural contexts. Theorists of vibration can learn from
feminist analyses of willfulness and readings of colonial archives that reveal
subjecthood’s situated histories. Understanding sound art or music as vibra-
tion “in the context of a community” affirms thematerial impact of vibration,
while acknowledging its continuous productive relation to generative sub-
jects who are not equivalent or interchangeable. Mirroring Chen’s inability to
scream, our inability to hear the scream, relies on our inability to see the
screamer as human.
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1. Arguably, it is preciselyChen’s intermediawork and interest in “sensoryhallucination” that
characterize her music, but it is also these properties that lead her to be “not infre-
quently . . . told that my music is not music” (Chen 2016). The insistence on categorical
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boundaries exposed in this refusal to assign Chen’s work tomusic demonstrates an endur-
ing impulse toward purity, toward “the divisions, the splits, the displacements that make
the possibility for the discovery of rationality” that Ashon Crawley criticizes with regard to
Kantian epistemology (2017, 115). In this sense, Chen’s work and similar work by others is
not only a contribution to music but a musical contribution to anticategorical philosoph-
ical thought. For more on the impulse to insist on separating “music” from extraneous
“non-musical” qualities, see James (2016).
2. We might hear in this description of Rosa’s work an echo of Bennett’s search for “an
orientation organized around the power of bodies-in-encounter, using ‘power’ in Spinoza’s
sense of the capacity to affect (to make a difference upon other bodies) and to be affected
(to be receptive to the affections of other bodies)” (Bennett 2015, 95–96).
3. Both James (2017a) and (2017b) arework-in-progress excerpts toward James’s forthcoming
book The Sonic Episteme: Acoustic Resonance and Biopolitics (Duke University Press). For
more on the naturalization of harmony, see James (2010, 37–49). In her work on timbre,
race, and the human voice, Nina SunEidsheimfinds conceptswith strong parallels to those
in social physics critiqued by James. For example, voice teachers assume racialized prop-
erties of their students’ bodies will determine what a healthy voice must sound like and
work toward maximizing resonance and freeing “blockages” to access “what they under-
stand as the singer’s ‘inner essence’” (Eidsheim 2015, 6).
4. To further understand the ways in which Bennett’s vibrant matter might resonate with
both Ngai’s critique of cuteness and her concept of animatedness, see Bennett (2015).
Bennett reads a television advertisement for GAP trousers, identifying the trousers as
having what she terms “animacy,” and asking “are the pants animated by the flesh of the
dancers, orwere thedancers animatedby the clothing?” (2015, 98)This example showshow
a theory of vibrant matter can begin to render human action as unwilled and driven by a
preceding, material vibration (here attributed to the dancer’s trousers), which as we have
seen is presented as an implicitly universal or natural phenomenon, foreclosing analyses
that take into account the observer and the observed’s positionality.
5. George E. Lewis has noted the parallels betweenKarel Čapek’s writing on the robot, chattel
slavery in the United States, and such comments as Cather’s on ThomasWiggins, connect-
ing conceptions of mechanistic or robotic labor with the withholding of subjecthood from
those abducted and forced into slave labor (Lewis 2015).
6. I am grateful to TimothyMcCormack for drawingmy attention to Gillespie’s intervention.
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